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THE RISE OF LIBERALIsM: THE PHILOSOPHY OF A BUSINESS CIVILIZATION.
By Harold J. Laski.1 New York: Harper and Brothers, 1936. Pp. 327.
$3.50.
ORDINARILY, it is the business men who are either contemptuous or fearful
of liberalism. But here we have disparagement and warning from another
source. If Mr. Laski's historical appraisal of liberalism is valid, the business
men have been very unbusiness-like in their appraisals. In identifying liberal-
ism, Mr. Laski specifies important ideas that are usually associated with the
term. He then declares that these ideas do not exhibit the real nature and sig-
nificance of liberalism. Essentially, he holds, liberalism is the "philosophical
justification" of capitalism. During the period between the Reformation and
the French Revolution "new material conditions" were creating "new social
relationships." The latter needed a "new philosophy." Liberalism has sup-
plied that need. The philosophy consists, for the most part, of the following:
the assumption of a natural order of society, governed by laws discoverable
through reason, observation and experiment; rationalistic and "scientific" rea-
soning in the determination of political questions; a belief that state activity
in the field of economic affairs is essentially "unnatural"; a general commenda-
tion, therefore, of economic freedom and individual initiative and a general
disapproval of governmental regulation; a defense (within limits) of religious
toleration and freedom of inquiry. What "produced" these ideas was "the
emergence of a new economic society"-i.e., industrial capitalism. Liberalism
is "in its essence" the outlook of an economic class. "The liberty of liberalism
is set in the context of property."
The book traces historically these congenial relations between liberalism and
capitalism, from the seventeenth century to the present. Liberal attacks on
ecclesiastical privileges were "popular" in seventeenth-century England be-
cause of the opportunity that the abolition of privileges "opened up to the
King, the nobility and the upper classes for self-enrichment." Although
French liberal theorists of the eighteenth century demanded "the emancipa-
tion of the whole nation . . . when they applied themselves to the details
of their program, their theory limited its range to the freedom sought by men
of property." Religious toleration came "because, at bottom, persecution is
a threat to property" and "endangers the conditions of sound business enter-
prise." "It was, indeed, above all its cost that was the ruin of religious perse-
cution." The seventeenth and eighteenth-century attempts at a scientific un-
derstanding of nature were stimulated chiefly by the problems of business
men, who "in their search for wealth . . .required new power over nature."
Liberals found in nature the "natural form of government" that disclosed "the
principles commercial prosperity demands." Liberals took a negative attitude
toward government, chiefly in order that government should not despoil sub-
jects of their property. Free speech, as liberals have stood for it, has usually
meant freedom to say what business men want said. In general, therefore,
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liberals have advocated freedom in order that property and property-owners
might be free.
In some passages Mr. Laski appears to regard liberals as knowing just
what they are doing. AMen who have opposed the efforts to establish, through
law, decent standards of education, health, housing and working conditions,
have acted as true liberals. For it is "inherent" in liberalism to want to keep
the working-classes in "their proper place"; and it is "always" the tendency
of liberalism to regard "the poor as men who have failed through their ovrn
fault." Yet many notable figures, who have been generally called liberals,
have had very different desires and attitudes in reference to working men
and the poor. They have set a greater value on preserving freedom of in-
quiry and on advancing the welfare, increasing the freedom and raising the
social status of workingmen and tenants than on increasing the wealth or
protecting the social and political superiority of business men. Mr. Laski,
unable to overlook such men altogether, admits that there are some "generous
minds" among liberals: exceptional men, such as T. H. Green and L. T.
Hobhouse. But how can he concede the term "liberal" to these men? They
are not only deliberately trying to promote an end which both they and busi-
ness men regard as being opposed to what Mr. Laski has characterized as the
"essential" objective of liberalism-namely, protection of the superior claims
of property-owners. They are also abandoning a method which Mr. Laski
has characterized as "inherent" in the policy of liberalism-namely, govern-
mental non-intervention in economic affairs. In what way are they liberal?
Mr. Laski's answer is that they are liberals because they really are, indirectly
and unintentionally, supporting capitalism-by persuading or driving it into
making the concessions that are necessary to save it from destruction. He
says that liberalism is generally "unconscious" of what it is doing.
I don't believe that Mr. Laski's argument is valid. I don't believe that the
policies advocated by liberals have been prevailingly of more benefit to prop-
erty-owners than to wage-earners and others on the lower economic levels.
And even when these policies do help capitalists, I don't believe that it is cor-
rect to call liberalism the philosophy of a business civilization. I doubt the
propriety of interpreting a philosophy in terms of what a writer thinks that
philosophy "unconsciously" leads to. Some writers believe that the advocacy
of socialist measures often plays into the hands of capitalists. I don't believe
that such writers, however honest and thoughtful they are in that belief,
would be justified, by their own judgment or by that of others, in calling
socialism the phhosophy of a capitalist civilization.
Mr. Laski, I believe, should have made his sub-title the main title of his
book; or he should have called it "The Rise of Economic Individualism."
Such an explicit announcement of what he was going to write about might
have made less striking his arguments and illustrations; for these would then
be serving merely to reveal that business men, or others who set chief store
on preserving a business civilization, usually advocate a governmental policy-
as to intervention or non-intervention-that is prevailingly favorable to
business men. That, I believe, is all that Mr. Laski does validly show. He
does that in the distinctive and brilliant style we look for in all his writings.
It should be noted, however, that for Marxists Mr. Laski has in this book
done just what he set out to do: namely, to show that liberalism is always
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the servant of capitalism. Some Marxists believe that he has done this so
effectively that liberals can no longer be "unconscious" of the nature of their
service. "From this time on", one reviewer exclaims, an avowal of liberalism
"becomes the clear acceptance of the philosophy of business."
Mr. Laski has recently taken the position, in writing reviews of other books
on political theory, that a record and interpretation of political ideas appears
"flat" and "static" if the writer does not tie the whole work together by a
single thread of historical interpretation: he cannot be "vivid" or "dynamic"
until he has devoted himself to a single social (i.e., economic) creed. I be-
lieve that in this attitude on style Mr. Laski may be over-rating the literary
capacities of the writers whose style he criticizes, and under-rating his own.
If the writers have appeared flat and colorless, they would probably show up
about as badly in attempts at more partisan exposition. And Laski, I believe,
would still be dynamic and vivid, even if he should make a serious effort at
objectivity.
FRANCIS W. COKER t
New Haven, Conn.
CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS. By Elliott E. Cheat-
ham,' Noel T. Dowling,2 and Herbert F. Goodrich.3 Chicago: The Found-
ation Press, Inc., 1936. Pp. xliv, 1148. $7.00.
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS. By Charles Wendell Carna-
han.4 Rochester: The Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Company, 1935.
Pp. xiii, 1142. $6.50.
I AM going to risk that chronic complaint against the book reviewer-that
he writes not about the book he is reviewing but upon whatever ideas happen
to pop into his head while leafing through the volume he has obtained under
false pretenses. But who wants a description of a casebook-and, a forliori,
two casebooks ? Certainly not the teachers in the field. If they have been so
delinquent in the discharge of their professional duties as not already to have
acquired copies of both books, they should resort forthwith to the publishers,
not to the book review departments. Let them count the cases decided since
1900 themselves. As for those others who are so addicted to the reading
of book reviews that they cannot resist even the review of two casebooks
outside their pedagogical jurisdictions, surely they can have no complaint
if what is contained herein should prove broader in its implications than the
two books in question. And if what eventuates is not a review of those books
but an essay upon the occasion of their publication, that is a matter which
"]Professor of Government, Yale University.
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2. Professor of Law. Columbia University.
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the responsible editor of this journal must justify to his board and to his
own conscience.
The problems in the Conflict of Laws which remain open are not very
consequential from a social standpoinL I except only those relating to divorce.
Obviously we must have rules to govern place of trial and the recognition
of foreign judgments, arid rules--or principles-or a techniqu--for choos-
ing between competing laws. But only obduracy in self-stultification could
have prevented courts, legislatures and lawyers from devising reasonably
adequate procedures to cope with these problems; and, while their work has
left room for improvement, the evils to be extirpated are not comparable
to those persisting in fields which exercise less fascination upon the legal
scholar.
Nor do Conflict of Laws problems bulk very large in the lawyer's practice.
Doubtless few attorneys escape some contact with knotty questions in this
field, but there are half a dozen or more branches of the law within the
range of courses comprising the third year curriculum which contribute more
grist to the lawyer's mill. The champion of the importance of the Conflict
of Laws in the law school curriculum is hard put to establish it as "practical"
unless he is adept in the devices of the late G. I. Chesterton.
Despite these considerations, the Conflict of Laws is one of the major
courses from the standpoints of hours allotted and of student attendance
in the third year law curriculum in most law schools, that third year which
is crowded with courses important in one or both of the respects in which
Conflicts is deficient. It seems to me that to encourage, indeed, to justify,
the attention which Conflicts is receiving, the teacher must be prepared to
make a contribution more significant than the familiarization of his students
with the body of law created by court and legislature in that field. And it is
with reference to this pedagogical problem that I think any Conflicts case-
book must be evaluated.
If one seeks an explanation of the academic eminence of Conflicts, I think
he will find it in the fact that in its doctrine there has developed a juris-
prudence more conscious, more comprehensive, and, in the actual decision of
cases, more consequential than is to be found in any other branch of the
common law. The student has stepped from the welter of narrow issues,
historical anomalies, and practical compromises into a loftier, purer realm
wherein the rules which he has sought to assay in other courses of study
emerge refined of the dross that had troubled him there. He has been guided
to an inquiry into the nature of these rules and led to extend or delimit their
application to particular cases in accordance with the dictates of a coherent
body of doctrine, brushing aside the aberrations of misguided courts. It
is exhilarating to swing from torts to contracts to property ("immovable"
and "movable", not just "real" and "personal") and thence to the assorted
status, dipping, en route, into such esoterica as rcnzvoi and the doctrine of
qualifications.
Moreover, the insinuation of the serpent of Realism into this intellectual
Eden has enhanced, rather than diminished, its attractions. For the Con-
flicts scholar who tastes of the heady fruit of the Tree of Newer Knowledge
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is not cast out, as is his confrere in Sales and Mortgages, to delve by the
sweat of his brow for Facts. Instead, he can bask in the shade of the Tree,
coining incantations to exorcise conceptual sorceries. Without stirring a hand,
he can divest A of a right created by the law of State X, and, presto! create
in A a right by the law of State F which is every bit as good as the old one.
Or he can deplore the plight of parties enmeshed in the gears of a mechanical
jurisprudence and invoke a frei Rechtsfindung guided by unspecified social
and economic insights.5 When the hour comes for this scholar to turn to
teaching, he then can season the problems of conflicting laws with the polemics
of the conflicting doctors.
Where, in this happy state of things, lurks the problem? The problem, I
submit, lies in the fact that philosophical tidbits which make Conflicts tasty
to the student are not alone sufficient to justify so large a place for the course
in his third year dietary. If this place is to be justified, it should be because
the course compels the student to chew the conceptualist's theory and the
realist's conceptions down to the bare bones and gristle. He won't derive
much informational nourishment from the fare, but he'll toughen his mental
mandibles.
And this, at long last, leads to casebooks, for it is the casebook editor
who determines in large measure what is to be proffered the student. Now
the editor's publisher is conscious of the desires and digestions of a diversity
of teachers and students. If the editor were to compile a casebook a th0se,
he would probably find that his theses, pedagogical and juristic, did not
correspond to those entertained by many of his peers. For very practical
reasons, fortified often by his own convictions, he therefore adopts the cafe-
teria plan. He spreads something of everything on display.
To attempt to bolt all the available dishes in the sixty or forty-five hours
comprising a Conflicts course will produce either acute mental indigestion
or intellectual flatulence, depending on whether the food is served raw or
in the spoon. Most tcachers don't try to oblige their students to do this,
or, if they do, fortunately they fail in the attempt. They select or have selec-
tion forced upon them. But if they feel, with me, that informational content
is of relatively small consequence in this course and wish to concentrate on
the kind of fare which I have prescribed above, they will have to go outside
the casebook. This can be done, of course, with a small class, but it just
doesn't work well. It reduces to a minimum the opportunity for selection
and pruning, the provocative juxtaposition of dogma and heresy, and the
use of other such devices for the pointing of inquiry. Moreover, there is not
the assurance of timely reading when the material assigned is on the library
shelves and not in the casebook.
Professors Cheatham and Dowling and Dean Goodrich are aware of the
importance of those aspects of the Conflicts problems to which I attach so
high a value, and they have endeavored, without sacrificing coverage, to give
them emphasis. This is done, directly, by the use of text statements intro-
ductory to various sections, by brief excerpts from law review articles and
treatises and, indirectly, by arrangement and annotation. Though a com-




forward. But, wilfully, I cannot refrain from wishing that they had called
in one more collaborator, Professor Stumberg, whose treatise for students
has just been published by the same press. If a few hundred pages of case
material had been excised to make way for fifty pages of Professor Stum-
berg's text, room would have been made for more material of the sort that
seems to me essential if Conflicts is to be the rigorous discipline that it can
and should be.
Professor Carnahan has been more daring. Distinctly his is a casebook
6 thse, and his thesis is primarily a pedagogical one. Implicit in the organ-
ization of his book is the bold assumption that a third-year student may be
expected to go into a Conflicts class knowing more about the subject for the
day's discussion than he is likely to know at the end of a class for which
he has prepared in the usual manner. Under each topic (and he has covered
them all), he has brought together some of the principal writings on the
subject (entire law review articles and substantial excerpts from articles,
treatises, and the Restatement). Then comes a group of cases, a shorter
selection, of course, than is customary. Finally follows a group of problem
cases (digests of actual decisions) upon which, after perhaps a prelimiiary
hour or so of discussion, attention is to be focussed.
It is not to be supposed that this will make the student's task easier. In-
deed, it is the demands which the method makes upon the student's time and
the instructor's ingenuity that give rise to my principal doubts concerning
his experiment. But I am confident that, given an instructor who will
realize that this book will require a new teaching technique and who wi
make the exertion necessary for its mastery, and, given students who sin-
cerely desire that diversification in instructional method, the lack of which
it has become habitual for the third year student to deplore, then the use
of this book will yield fruits which will abundantly repay the effort exacted
of both parties. I must add, however, that Professor Carnahan's interest
does not seem to have been pointed to the type of problem which I feel is
deserving of chief emphasis. His materials, nevertheless, contain much that
would aid in such a development of the course.
One word more, to testify that, although a delinquent reviewer, I am not
without compunction. Had I taken occasion to describe the work of the
triumvirate from Columbia and Pennsylvania, I think I could have demon-
strated what everyone who knows its editors will assume: that it is a thought-
ful, ingenious, carefully edited, and scholarly work. Moreover, I can offer
testimony more convincing than a compliment: I used the book one year in
its mimeographed form and I am using it now. Despite this public yearning
after my private moon, I like the new book. And some day, when my avail-
able time is equal to my interest, I hope to follow Professor Carnahan in
his interesting experiment. It might, I think, prove wholesome for law
teaching generally if others were to do likewise.
DAvrD F. CAv-mtS
Durham, N. C.
tProfessor of Law, Duke University.
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THE KING AND His Do.MINIoN GOVERNORS. Br the Hon. Mr. Justice Herbert
Vere Evatt. London: Oxford University Press, 1936. Pp. xi, 324. $5.00.
THIS IMPORTANT book, by one of the Justices of the High Court of Aus-
tralia, may be described as an essay on the ambiguities of British constitutional
conventions.
The dynamic factor in British constitutional growth has been the process
of gradual participation in the exercise of Crown powers by one section of
the community after another. Thus in the course of centuries these powers
have one by one become defined, specialised, and then institutionalised. But
always there has remained the concept of "reserve powers" inherent in the
Crown: powers, that is to say, which have not become accurately defined and
institutionalised. And even though the area of these powers has been drasti-
cally curtailed since the time of the Tudors, some such powers have been
allowed to remain. Nevertheless, in the last two centuries custom has come
to determine the way in which they should be utilised. And with the extension
of self-government to the colonies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
there has come the transfer of this same fundamental constitutional situation
to each of the Dominions. At the heart of all these constitutional organisms
there lie the uninstitutionalised reserves of Crown power.
It is the main contention of ir. Justice Evatt that these reserve powers
are now leading to a serious constitutional situation wherever they obtain:
and that because of the uncertainty surrounding them. It is true, he admits,
that convention has more or less satisfactorily regulated their exercise in the
past. But lie maintains that this has been due not to any adequacy in the con-
ventions themselves but rather to the fact that they operated in peculiarly
favourable circumstances; in particular, the existence of a fairly stable two-
party system and the tacit acceptance by both parties of basic economic postu-
lates. Now, however, he contends, with the multiplication of parties and
with the calling into question of economic fundamentals by one or more of
those parties. the unsatisfactory nature of the old conventions is increasingly
being revealed.
"It is often impossible to tell", says the author, "whether the conventions
are being obeyed, because no one can say with sufficient certainty what the
conventions are." And he stresses five major questions in particular, the
answers to all of which are so far from being certain that eminent constitu-
tionalists-as well as Dominion Governors themselves-may be found giving
incompatible answers. These five problems we may roughly formulate as fol-
lows: In what circumstances may the King (or his representative) refuse to
his ministers a dissolution of Parliament when they ask for one? Cau the
Crown representative dismiss a ministry which still retains the confidence
of the popular Assembly, even though that Assembly may patently be mis-
representing public opinion on some grave issue which may have arisen since
its election, or may be flagrantly violating its electoral programme and
pledges? In what circumstances may the Crown make additions to the Upper
Chamber (where, of course, the Constitution allows for uch additions) in
order to ensure the passage of a Bill desired by the Lower House? Does the
Crown still retain the prerogative of being able to veto legislation. and what
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circumstances would warrant such a veto? And lastly, what precisely is the
relation subsisting between a Prime Minister and his Cabinet, and between
both these and the Crown: for example, if the Premier turns against his
Cabinet and his party, is the King (or his representative) bound to act on
the advice of the former alone?
Mr. Justice Evatt has discussed these matters with a wealth of learning
and with a knack of vivid citation. The argument is in no sense merely
speculative for the case method is used throughout. Some twenty "crises"
within the British Commonwealth (most of them from the past twenty-five
years) are narrated and analysed in detail, each of them involving one or
more of the ambiguities set forth above. The burden of the argument is that,
just as the whole evolution of the British Constitution has proceeded by way
of defining and institutionalising Crown powers as necessity arose, so in the
face of new necessities the time has come to define some of the remaining
reserve powers if chaos is to be avoided. It is not that the author pleads for
the elimination of these powers; quite the contrary: "it is plain that, upon
certain occasions, the failure of the Sovereign or his representative to protect
the people against acts of tyranny or usurpation on the part of Governnient
and Parliament may be just as detrimental to the true interests of the Crown,
although the prerogative is not exercised, as its exercise may be upon other
occasions." Two things therefore must be done. First, the reserve powers
must be defined and reduced to rules of positive law enacted by the competent
parliament of each of the constitutional units of the Commonwealth (just as,
for example, the relationship between the House of Commons and the House
of Lords was fixed by the Parliament Act of 1911). Second, the interpreta-
tion and maintenance of these rules "would then normally become the function
of some competent tribunal, judicial or arbitral." What is required by the
Crown and its representatives, in other words, is a position where their exer-
cise of great prerogative powers is controlled and regulated by general prin-
ciples openly stated, and applied with complete indifference to the welfare or
detriment of particular parties or interests. Only thus can the elimination be
secured of those grave personal responsibilities involved in the present exer-
cise of reserve powers by the King and (to an even greater degree) by his
Dominion representatives: and only so can the King continue to be kept
"out of politics."
Mr. Justice Evatt's analysis is impressive, and certainly disturbing. He
brings out forcibly the gravity of the problems under discussion and shows
dearly the dangers that may be incurred by the British democracies if these
ambiguities in their fundamental constitutional conventions are not satisfac-
torily resolved. And who that is mindful of the post-war constitutional history
of Europe can gainsay the urgency of the task? In the light of this analysis
one can do no other than assent to the observation of Dean K. H. Bailey,
of the Faculty of Law in the University of Melbourne, who in the course of
his felicitous introduction to this book says that, inasmuch as the very fate of
a constitution during periods of stress may depend on the adequacy of the
provisions it makes for emergency powers, "it is not too much to say that
the whole future of the British constitutional system is likely to depend on
the extent to which, in the next few years, it is demonstrated that the reserve
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powers of the Crown are not the antithesis but the corollary of the demo-
cratic principle that political authority is derived from the people."
C. H. DRIVERt
THE SALE OF FOOD AND DRINK. By Harry C. W. Melick.1 New York: Pren-
tice-Hall, Inc., 1936. Pp. xlii, 346. $5.00.
The present volume is announced in its preface as an effort to save the
time of the busy practitioner who has to advise on cases growing out of the
sale of food and drink.
The b6ok consists of thirteen chapters. One of these is devoted to a survey
of the historical origins of the law bearing on this topic. Ten chapters are
devoted to various aspects and applications of implied warranty of quality.
One separate chapter is devoted to negligence, and another to the question of
damages. The book sets forth in considerable detail many of the reported
cases, while citing in addition many other cases and other reference mate-
rials. Where a considerable number of decisions on various points have
accumulated in certain jurisdictions the book collects them, grouped accord-
ing to jurisdictions .arranged in alphabetical order. In the appendix are cer-
tain historically important early statutes, and certain pertinent reports from
the year books not otherwise commonly available. The table of contents is
so elaborate that it covers eleven pages. The index by itself covers twenty-
eight pages. It may thus be observed that the book opens the way to a great
mass of potentially applicable legal materials. Its mechanical arrangements,
furthermore, are such that the searcher for information may readily find
some lead or other that may guide him to certain particular details which he
may want to investigate.
While I appreciate the convenience with which this book makes the authori-
tative materials available for investigation, I am disappointed at its apparent
lack of thorough analysis of the underlying bases for liability. The problems
to be analyzed and solved in food cases are much broader than the familiar
sale transaction. Distribution of food products from original producer to
ultimate consumer in present-day marketing practice terminates in various
ways. Not only is food sold in grocery stores, but ultimate consumers of
food and drink are also provided for in hotels and restaurants as well as at
ice cream parlors, soda fountains and similar establishments. These estab-
lishments. again, may be operated independently, or they may be found in
connection with drug stores, department stores or other business undertak-
ings. The exact details of these marketing channels for food products, more-
over, are continually undergoing readjustment. Practical experimentation
is always going on in the quest for the business combination that under the
particular circumstances encountered in the instance will for the time being
prove the most suitable. Food products are thus actually distributed to ulti-
tAssociate Professor of Government, Yale University.
1. Member of the New York Bar.
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mate consumers through a considerable number of continually varying market-
ing methods. Through any one of these injury to ultimate consumers from
unwholesome food products may on occasion come about. Such injury may
affect many individuals in the instance completely outside the range of the
familiar relations of buyer and seller.
Within the familiar relations of buyer and seller liability for injury result-
ing from unwholesome food is readily explained in terms of the well-knowm
obligations of implied warranty. Outside of such relations, liability for such
injury is equally familiarly derived from facts involving negligence, a field
on the application of which in this regard, however, the authorities are sharp-
ly conflicting. Beyond these limits, moreover, where the facts do not indi-
cate negligent conduct, and at the same time the parties do not stand in the
relations of buyer and seller, the problem of finding some rational basis for
liability having the actual support of legal authority presents more difficulty
and complication. Can remote purchasers or users thus injured obtain
redress? Can patrons of restaurants and similar establishments, if in-
jured without negligence, obtain redress? As viewed through the terminol-
ogy of sales law, how far, if at all, can implied warranty obligations be niade
available to injured parties not standing in the immediate'relations of buyer
and seller? As viewed through the terminology of tort law, how far, if at all,
can redress based upon absolute liability be had from non-negligent distribu-
tors whose conduct in marketing unwholesome food products has caused the
damage in question? Is applying the obligations of implied warranty to par-
ties not standing in the relations of buyer and seller equivalent to applying
absolute liability for damage done? In present-day marketing practice, when
injuries occasioned by unwholesome food are involved, fundamental questions
such as these are encountered.
This book impresses me as making only a rudimentary beginning toward
the analysis and solution of the questions which underlie most of the detailed
problems discussed. Although judicial decisions and available statutes are
exhaustively cited, and many of them are briefly reviewed, and ten chapters,
by far the largest part of the book, are devoted to detailed applications of
implied warranty, the author fails squarely to face or adequately to analyze
the widely ramifying question as to whether implied warranty obligations are
necessarily promissory in nature and accordingly rest on contractual grounds.
Here and there throughout the book appear statements indicating positive
realization that implied warranties may go beyond contractual intention to be
bound, in that such obligations may be imposed by law by reason of repre-
sentations not in fact true but relied on by the other party to the transac-
tion. Where the parallel to absolute liability is noticed, however, neither is if
analyzed nor the bases in policy for its application identified. Instead, it is
merely attributed to the early statutes on the subject. The book manifests
no realization that the obligations familiarly called by the name of implied
warranties may on the basis of policy be imposed by law as an imposed stan-
dard of conduct quite independently of either promises or representations
of the parties in the instance. It shows but little if any realization that liabil-
ity by virtue of such implied warranties is broadly analogous to the growing
doctrine of absolute liability involved in many portions of the law of torts.
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Two of the most conspicuous instances of the limited conception of the
book may suffice for illustration. One of these is the question of recovery
by a remote third party, as injured consumer, against the original manufac-
turer of the injurious food product with whom the injured party had no
contractual relations. After discussing this situation from various angles
the book finally adopts as sound analysis and commends as a workable basis
for liability the position which regards the manufacturer's implied warranty
to his immediate purchaser as being conferred for the benefit of the ultimate
consumer. This reasoning, invoking the contract beneficiary doctrine to sup-
port liability to the remote purchaser, manifestly is derived from the under-
lying misconception that warranty obligations necessarily are contractual
in nature. The fact is, however, that in such cases the seller neither promised
nor intended to be bound to the ultimate purchaser. Invoking the contract
beneficiary doctrine under such circumstances manifestly is bald fiction, re-
sorted to for sustaining liability to a remote injured party for damages done
irrespective of contract or fault. Similar remark, of course, may be made
on the alternative form of speech sometimes employed in such cases, that the
original seller's implied warranty to his immediate purchaser runs to sub-
sequent parties on the analogy of covenants running with the land. In all
these cases, manifestly, behind these forms of speech is a question on the
merits which needs analysis. That question is whether and how far in such
cases considerations of policy call for liability for damage caused irrespective
of contract or fault.
Another phase of Mr. Melick's argument which raises questions is his
discussion of the restaurant keeper's liability. Restaurant keepers are of
course liable for damages due to negligence in their service of food. That
restaurant keepers are not liable beyond negligence has been assumed in many
courts. The statutory material presented in this book affords demonstration
that such assumption is historically unsound. That such assumption is also
logically unsound is equally demonstrable, in that it fails to take into account
certain elements calling for absolute liability that are involved in the facts of
restaurant cases. This book, however, does not attempt to make that demon-
stration. It seems at this point again not to have shaken off entirely the erro-
neous belief that implied warranty is necessarily contractual in its nature. It
devotes a great deal of effort to prove that service of food in restaurants is
both historically and logically to be classified as a sale, seeking through that
form of speech to justify the application of the familiar law of implied war-
ranty in sales also to restaurant keepers. To the present reviewer such ra-
tionalization, though supported by occasional authority, seems artificial and
futile. It would seem to be much simpler, as well as much closer both to the
historical analysis and to the practical facts, to recognize that so-called war-
ranty obligations are not confined to sale transactions. They do not even
depend on finding in the instance a contractual element on which to rest.
They may be independently imposed by law by reason of considerations of
policy. In that view. too, the important further question should be faced of
whether liability in restaurant cases, if going beyond the basis of negligence,
may in the aggregate do more harm than good on account of its encourage-
ment to spurious claims.
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This book conveniently sets out or points the way to a great repository of
authoritative but confused and conflicting legal materials in a field of uncer-
tain limits where underlying considerations are complex and sharply con-
flicting. So far, so good. Much more effective for practical purposes it could
have been, however, had it been stronger on the side of analysis, pointing out




HIISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES, 1896-1932, VOL. III: Work-
ing Conditions by Don D. Lescohier;' Labor Legislation by Elizabeth
Brandeis.2 New York: Macmillan, 1935. Pp. xxx, 778. $4.50.
MoRE than twenty-five years ago, the Carnegie Institution of Washington
launched an elaborate plan by which the economic history of the United
States was to be divided into twelve fields, within each of which a com-
prehensive treatise was to be prepared by competent scholars. Responsibility
for the section dealing with the history of labor, initially in charge of Carroll
D. Wright, was assumed in 1909 by Professor John R. Commons of the
University of Wisconsin. Following friction between the Carnegie Institution
and its Department of Economics and Sociology, volumes one and two of the
History of Labor in the United States, written by John R. Commons and
six associates, appeared in 1918 under the auspices of the Board of Research
Associates in American Economic History. These two volumes, which
brought the labor history of the United States up to 1896, were well received
in academic circles. Though they suffered considerably from the absence of
an adequate interpretation of the growth of the labor movement, they served
as excellent reference books covering obscure periods in our labor history.
The present volume aims to carry on the work launched by Professor
Commons. It brings the story of labor legislation and of working conditions
of labor down to the year 1932. Trade union developments, 1896-1932, are
reserved for volume four, which also appeared in 1935. The treatment of
working conditions and of labor legislation in volume three is only moderate-
ly successful. Its thirty chapter are of differing qualities. The topics treated
range from population and immigration problems to wage questions, public
works programs, issues of unemployment relief and unemployment insurance,
employers' welfare schemes, and the several brands of labor legislation. These
materials are not integrated save through a rambling but most interesting
foreword to the volume, prepared by Professor Commons, in which he sets
forth with characteristic vigor a somewhat unconvincing vindication of the
class-collaboration policies of A. F. of L. unionism. Indeed, one feels that the
t Professor of Law, University of Nebraska.
1. Professor of Economics, University of Wisconsin.
2. Instructor in Economics, University of Wisconsin.
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material is of the sort one would find, frequently in better form, under the
topic headings in the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. The sections on
employee representation and company policies are especially incomplete and
reflect both an underestimation of the importance of company unions and an
underappraisal of the other techniques by which employers have sought to
check the expansion of trade unionism.
The sections on labor legislation, prepared by Elizabeth Brandeis, show
a commendable thoroughness but, like the rest of the book, go little beyond
a mass of specific quotations of experiences in the several states, court de-
cisions, and administrative efforts. We get no adequate glimpse of the forces
brought to bear, for or against most of the measures, or the defects in the
capitalistic system which necessitated the resort to additional state action.
One may interpret this book as being a representative product of the
Wisconsin group which for so long was given vitality by Professor Commons.
For thirty years, his students were nurtured on a belief in a "balanced
capitalism". Their plea for progressive labor legislation and for the business
unionism of the American Federation of Labor type gained for them a con-
siderable following as sponsors of a pleasing substitute for the Marxian
economic doctrines prevalent in European labor circles. The increasing
trend toward radicalism in labor movements both here and abroad, suggests,
however, that class forces may be more powerful than Professor Commons'
students have believed. COLSTON WARNrEt
Amherst, Mass.
tProfessor of Economics, Amherst College.
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